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BASEBALL, HOT DOGS, APPLE PIE, AND
STRIKES: HOW BASEBALL COULD HAVE
AVOIDED THEIR LATEST STRIKE BY
STUDYING SPORTS LAW FROM BRITISH
FOOTBALL
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 1994 Major League Baseball Season, the New
York Yankees and the Montreal Expos had the best records in the
American and National Leagues, respectively.' However, neither team
made it to the World Series.2 Impossible, you say? Not during the
1994 season, which ended abruptly in August due to a players' strike.'
As the players and owners disputed over financial matters, fans were
deprived of a World Series for the second time in the history of the
game.4 America's favorite pastime was in peril.
Like baseball, British football has had its share of labor-manage-
I. When the final standings of the 1994 baseball season were tabulated, the New York
Yankees had the highest winning percentage in the American League with .619, six and a half
games ahead of the competition in their division. The Montreal Expos also had a six game lead
over other teams in the National League East, leading the National League with a .649 winning
percentage. Baseball: The Final Outi What Might Have Happened, ORANGE COUNTY REG.
(Cal.), Sept. 15, 1994, at Dl.
2. Some talk did arise, however, of the Yankees and Expos playing a "World Series" for
charity, a proposal made by a former limited partner of the Expos. Nevertheless, the proposal
never amounted to more than a mere laugh by all those involved in baseball. Bob Hertzel,
Yanks-Expos Series An Unlikely Prospect, THE RECORD (N. N.J.), Sept. 22, 1994, at S6.
3. Strike Update, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1994, at 8C.
4. The first canceled World Series occurred in 1904, which would have been the second
World Series played. New York Giants manager John McGraw refused to let his National
League champions play the Boston Pilgrims, the American League leaders, due to his personal
feud with American League officials. Simon C. Gonzalez, There's Always Next Year...
Maybe: Rest of Season, Rest of Series, Victims of Baseball Strike, Fr. WORTH STAR-TELE-
GRAM, Sept. 15, 1994, at 1.
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ment problems. Known to Americans as soccer, the sport attracts large
numbers of fans throughout Britain. The popularity of British football
has led to diligent attempts by those involved in the sport to keep its
labor-management wars under control.
As this comment will explore, the current ills that led to the 1994
baseball strike have already passed through the sport of British foot-
ball. With that in mind, American baseball owners and players should
have taken their history lesson from British football experiences and
avoided their latest altercation. What Major League Baseball (MLB)
participants failed to realize is that the proposed methods of curbing
outrageous expenses they intended to use in the new collective bargain-
ing agreement were previously tried in British football.' In the British
football system, those methods did not yield positive results.6 Had
MLB participants learned from the British football model, already
imprinted and unused 1994 World Series balls may not have been on
sale in the New York Times newspaper.'
II. REASONS FOR THE 1994 BASEBALL STRIKE
It was no surprise to anyone that the 1994 strike centered around
financial matters. Accordingly, many baseball fans formed opinions as
to who was at fault for the money-focused strike However, it may be
assumed that many people were unaware of exactly what those finan-
cial matters were.
In order to fully explain the reasons for the strike, a history of the
events leading up to the strike must be developed. On September 7,
1992, Fay Vincent submitted what many people considered to be his
"forced" resignation as Commissioner of Major League Baseball.'
Since then, Bud Selig has been operating as the Acting Commissioner
of Baseball until the job vacancy is permanently filled.' ° Soon after
5. See discussion infra sec. III.
6. See discussion infra sec. III.
7. As a promotional sale, and to get rid of unused balls, the New York Times displayed
an ad for 1994 World Series balls. See Pat Hickey, One Man's Tax is Another Man's Salary
Cap, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 1994, at D2.
8. The baseball strike was the subject of several opinion polls during 1994 and 1995.
Near the beginning of the strike, thirty-nine percent of those polled thought the owners were
"more right" regarding their position in the strike, while twenty-two percent thought the play-
ers had the correct stance. Baseball Strike Poll (CBS News broadcast, Aug. 19, 1994). When
the striking issues were finally put on the back burner to start the 1995 season, it was an even
split at 27% siding with the owners and the same percentage siding with the players. Baseball
Strike Poll (Gallup Org. Apr. 4, 1995).
9. Baseball Needs a Leader, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 1994, at A18. Vincent was pre-
sumed to have resigned because many in MLB were dissatisfied with Vincent's involvement in
negotiations with the players' union during the 1990 Spring Training lockout.
10. Bruce Jenkins, Day Dark-Our Pastime in Ruins, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1994, at Al.
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Selig took on the acting role, he opened negotiations in December of
1992 regarding a new collective bargaining agreement." The collec-
tive bargaining agreement in force at the time was due to expire on
December 31, 1993.12 However it was not until June of 1994, in the
midst of what many deem baseball's greatest season in decades, 3 that
Selig put forth the proposal for the new agreement which included a
salary cap provision.'4
A. Salary Cap
The salary cap was intended to work as its name states: an im-
posed league standard maximum salary that no team was allowed to
exceed. 5 The proposal was brought about by the owners who com-
plained that high costs of players' salaries have led to economic diffi-
culties. 6 The salary cap proposal was put on the table in an effort to
combat the owners' rising costs contention. '
7
The proposal did not receive a warm reception in the players'
camp.'" Instead, the players insisted that other measures should be used
Interestingly enough, Mr. Selig is also an owner of a Major League Club: the Milwaukee
Brewers. Id.
11. Id.
12. See generally Major League Baseball & Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., Basic
Agreement, 1990 [hereinafter Basic Agreement, 1990]. See also Ronald Blum, No Lockout-
Baseball Finally Back/Abbreviated Season Starts on April 26, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 1995, at
Al.
13. Baseball: The Final Out/What Might Have Happened, supra note 1, at Dl. At the time
of the strike, San Diego's Tony Gwynn was batting .394 and could have become baseball's
first .400 hitter since Ted Williams in 1941; Triple Crown possibilities were Frank Thomas of
the Chicago White Sox and Albert Belle of the Cleveland Indians, a feat not accomplished
since 1967; Ken Griffey, Jr. of the Seattle Mariners and San Francisco's Matt Williams were
eyeing Roger Maris' 61 home runs in a season record; Greg Maddux of the Atlanta Braves,
with a 1.56 ERA, was chasing his third consecutive Cy Young award; and most shocking, the
Cleveland Indians were actually contenders for their first post season berth in forty years. Id.
14. Jenkins, supra note 10, at AI.
15. Steve Halvonik, Strike Starts to Threaten Sale of Bucs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. !1,
1994, at El. A minimum salary was also part of the salary cap proposal of the owners. See
Jerry Crasnick, Rockies Don't Have to Share, DEN. POST, Sept. 3, 1994, at D2.
16. Glenn Dickey, Going, Going, Gone. . . That's All for Baseball in 1994, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 15, 1994, at B1.
17. This contention should be considered with the following facts in mind. Baseball gener-
ated $1.8 billion in revenue in 1993, as compared to 1983 when the revenue was $521 million.
The record price for a baseball team in 1983 was $43 million but jumped to $173 million in
1993. Yet it also should be noted that the average players salary in 1983 was $289,000 as
compared to the 1993 league average of $1.1 million. John Helyar, Sports: Why Can't Athletes
and Owners Learn to Play Nice Together?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1994, at B1.
18. As Chicago Cubs first baseman Mark Grace was quoted saying, all that needed to be
done was take the salary cap proposal off of the table and the strike would be over in an hour.
Phil Rogers, Baseball Owners Warm to Revenue Sharing Without Cap, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept.
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to fight baseball's rising costs."9 As a result, when the owners refused
to take the salary cap proposal off of the negotiating table, the 1994
baseball strike ensued. 20
B. Revenue Sharing
As mentioned above, the players offered their own plan in an
attempt to aid the owners with their contention of rising costs. Instead
of the salary cap, the Players' Association proposal called for the
owners to share revenue. 2 For instance, teams that amass great reve-
nue, like the New York Yankees, would share with those teams that
are not so lucrative, like the San Diego Padres."
The owners of the big clubs that generate more revenue were not
totally opposed to the revenue sharing suggestion. However, as a
prerequisite for such revenue sharing, the owners still wanted a salary
cap.24 Yet, as mentioned above, the players were starkly opposed to
any kind of agreement that contained a salary cap provision.25 The
strike rolled on.
C. Back To The Beginning
Negotiations between the sides continued sporadically during the
off season.26 On December 22, 1994, when the owners saw no agree-
6, 1994, at D5.
19. The players proposed a revenue sharing program, which will be discussed at length
below. Id. Much later, in negotiation talks, a tax on the higher revenue producing clubs, to be
redistributed to lower income clubs, was proposed. Tim Sullivan, For Baseball, It May Be
Now or Never, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 8, 1994, at Cl. Again, this point will be discussed later.
20. One commentator has suggested that the strike was not about a salary cap, but about
control of the game that the owners want back. He suggests that the owners want out of the
arbitration system under which baseball currently operates and a chance to make all the profits
they can. Bob Smizik, Strike All About Control of Game, PITT. POST-GAZETE, Sept. 8, 1994,
at Dl. However, many did feel that the central issue in the strike was the owners' demands for
a salary cap. E.g., Blum, supra note 12, at Al.
21. John Lowe, Commentary Optimism? Deadline Not Enforced, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 10,
1994, at DI.
22. Baseball Needs A Leader, supra note 9, at AI8.
23. Helyar, supra note 17, at B 1. While many owners were willing to do whatever they
could to control rising costs, none wanted to institute any plan without their sought after salary
cap proposal. See also Lowe, supra note 21, at D1.
24. Lowe, supra note 21, at DI.
25. Rogers, supra note 18, at D5. As San Francisco managing partner Peter Magowan
noted, "They keep saying they'll never accept a salary cap. It seems like they've said every-
thing they've got, they're going to keep, and have some other goodies added to it." Larry
Stone, Owners' Strategy A Grim Surprise Facing Players, They Didn't Waver Baseball: It's
Over, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al.
26. See Play ball? The Next 48 Hours Will Tell, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Apr. 1,
1995, at B6.
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ment in sight, they attempted to declare an impasse in negotiations.27
According to the collective bargaining agreement under which the
players and owners were operating before the strike began,28 if a con-
siderable amount of negotiation took place with no new agreement, an
impasse could be declared.29 If an impasse were to be declared, the
owners would then be free to adopt the last offer they presented to the
players in negotiation by unilaterally changing provisions of the exist-
ing agreement.3" This last offer would be the salary cap proposal.
However, this was avoided when the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) stepped in on behalf of the players before an impasse
could be declared.3 The NLRB cited the owners with attempting to
declare an illegal impasse,32 which is a violation of the duty to bar-
gain collectively under the National Labor Relations Act." On Febru-
ary 3, 1995, the owners avoided sanctions from this violation by agree-
ing to withdraw the impasse declaration and to restore the terms and
conditions of the prior agreement that had expired.34
On February 6, 1995, the owners' Player Relations Committee
said that it would be the exclusive bargaining agent for all the clubs.35
The players stated that this move eliminated the salary arbitration, free-
agency bidding, and anti-collusion clause, all of which the owners had
agreed to restore three days before the committee became the exclusive
agent.36 The NLRB once again stepped in and brought new charges of
unfair labor practices against the owners and sought an injunction to
force the owners to restore the above mentioned provisions. 7
U.S. District Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor's ruling on March 31,
1995, granted the injunction ordering the owners to restore the expired
collective bargaining agreement of December 1993.11 Sotomayor stat-
ed that the injunction would remain in effect until either a new agree-
27. Ross Newhan, Baseball Players End Their Strikel Owners Plan Meeting to Decide on
Lockout, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 1, 1995, at Al.
28. Basic Agreement, 1990, supra note 12.
29. An impasse would mean that the sides negotiated to a stalemate position. Silverman v.
Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 880 F. Supp. 246, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see
generally Basic Agreement, 1990, supra note 12.
30. See Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 253-54.
31. Newhan, supra note 27, at Al.
32. Id.
33. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see also Silverman,
880 F. Supp. at 253.
34. Newhan, supra note 27, at Al.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 880 F. Supp. 246, 261
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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ment was reached, a final disposition of the NLRB case on unfair labor
practice was made, or a finding by the court that an impasse in good
faith bargaining had occurred, which would then dissolve the injunction
and allow owners to make changes in conditions that are normally
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.39
With the injunction being upheld, the players called off their strike
and play resumed almost as if the strike had never occurred.4° How-
ever, the sides are still incurably divided on the salary cap issue.41
Thus, a resolution of this problem does not seem to be in sight.
III. SIMILAR SITUATIONS IN BRITISH FOOTBALL
Although the British football system may not have the answers to
properly and prosperously settle the MLB dispute, they have imple-
mented both the salary cap and revenue sharing plans in the past.
History has shown that neither plan worked well for British football.42
A. Maximum Wage
British football began in the public schools of Britain. It was
taught by the headmasters to encourage "diligence" among students.43
Soon thereafter, representatives of a small number of clubs formed the
39. Id.
40. An attempted appeal by the owners to stay the injunction also proved fruitless. Owners
Whiffed By Court; Season To Start April 26, CIl. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at 2.
41. Blum, supra note 12, at Al.
42. It should be noted at this juncture, interesting similarities between the two sports make
this comparison quite appropriate. First, baseball became an organized sport in the United
States in the mid to late 1800s. See generally, Kevin A. Rings, Note, Baseball Free Agency
and Salary Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 243, 244 (1987). British football also
organized in the mid to late 1800s, around the same time as baseball. See generally, TONY
MASON, ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL AND ENGLISH SOCIETY 1863-1915, at 15 (1980). This close
proximity of development of the two sports would seem to suggest that both were likely to
experience the same type of labor-management problems around the same time.
Secondly, because Britain operates under the Common Law system, there are no such
laws as anti-trust laws. Although it has come under scrutiny because of the 1994 strike, a
precedent of Supreme Court decisions has made baseball the only professional spo-t in the
United States that enjoys an exemption from the anti-trust laws. E.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972). Thus, neither sport operates under any anti-trust law provisions. Many have pro-
posed that all of baseball's labor-management problems could be solved if such an exemption
was lifted. E.g., James Kilpatrick, There's a Logical Way to End Baseball Strikes Forever,
STATE J.-REG.(Ill.), Sept. 20, 1994, at 4. While this point clearly has merit, this paper seeks
to find another solution to baseball's problems by working within the legal framework under
which baseball has operated since 1922. See Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
43. STEPHEN WAGG, THE FOOTBALL WORLD 3 (1984). For an excellent discussion regard-
ing the beginnings of British football, as well as baseball in the United States, see Peter N.
Katz, A History of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain: Who's Leading the
Charge?, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 371, 397 (1994).
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Football Association (FA)." The FA was organized basically as an
agreement to compete under one set of laws." It oversaw the laws of
the game and became the ultimate authority for all British football.6
In due time, the sport entered the professional realm and devel-
oped many leagues under the supervision of the FA. 7 In 1888, the
Football League was established. 8 The Football League was made up
of four divisions with objectives similar to the FA.49 However, the
Football League concerned itself more with the commercial aspects of
the game than the rule developing aspect of the game with which the
FA was concerned.5" The FA became somewhat of a "parent" organi-
zation to the Football League, but encompassed other leagues as
well.5' In most respects, the Football League and the FA operate in
the same manner today.52
Once the Football League was developed, owners began to feel the
effects that go along with owning professional teams, including wage
demands by full-time professional players. 3 To curb higher wages,
the owners attempted to institute a Maximum Wage beyond which no
players were to be paid. 4 For several seasons, the issue of the Maxi-
mum Wage was proposed to the owners but never received the three-
quarter majority it needed to pass.5 In 1900, the FA began their own
action to adopt a Maximum Wage. 6 Rule 32 of the Football Associa-
44. MASON, supra note 42, at 15. The FA was formed in 1863. Id.
45. Id.
46. Katz, supra note 43, at 398 (citing MASON, supra note 42, at 16).
47. Id. at 398-99.
48. Id. at 400. Mason also notes that the league idea was probably borrowed from Ameri-
can baseball. MASON, supra note 42, at 17.
49. See Eastham v. NewCastle United Football, Ltd., [1964] 1 Ch. 413, 417.
50. Id. at 417.
51. Id.
52. One might relate the set up of the FA and the Football League with the FA being the
equivalent of Major League Baseball and the National (or American) League being equated to
the Football League. Major League Baseball sets certain rules under which each team in the
league is required to operate. Furthermore, the National League may then develop their own
rules, like requiring pitchers to bat, as the American League requires designated hitters. Al-
though the setup of the FA and Football League are not exactly the same as the analogy set
forth here, it provides a basis to understanding the FA and the Football League.
53. MASON, supra note 42, at 96.
54. Id. at 98.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 98-99.
Rule 32 of the F.A. set out [that] . . . Clubs shall not pay any player a bonus
of more than Ten Pounds as a consideration for his signing a professional
form. A bonus cannot be paid to a player on his resigning from his old club.
The maximum wages which may be paid to any player shall be Four Pounds
per week or £208 per annum, and the payment of bonuses dependent on the
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tion instituted a Maximum Wage that the Football League was to hon-
or, beginning in the 1901-02 season.
7
The Maximum Wage was intended to strengthen a competitive
balance in the league so that the wealthier clubs were not hording all of
the talented athletes. 8 Many in Britain felt that if wages were not
regulated in the sport, "it would spell ruin in many cases.""
B. Maximum Wage Failure
Shortly after the Maximum Wage was instituted, many argued for
its termination.' From the beginning, the wealthier clubs, who be-
lieved they were getting the raw end of the deal, began to campaign for
the repeal of the law.6 The affluent clubs stated that a Maximum
Wage interfered with their ability to undertake their business in a
laissez-faire economy.62 However, some owners who favored the
Maximum Wage system argued that such fixing was "common in
commercial life" and was justified in order to keep the football market
competitive.63
From its inception, the Maximum Wage system was hard to regu-
late due to a misappropriation of funds to certain players.' Several
clubs were rumored to have been paying players more than the Maxi-
mum Wage and secretly providing players with bonuses for playing
well.6S To investigate the matter, from 1903 to 1904, the Football
Association Council had their Rules Revision Committee probe into the
allegations of impropriety in the Football League.' After the big
clubs in the League realized that the allegations would turn up positive
results, they agreed to an "amnesty proposal" by the Football Associa-
tion7 The proposal exonerated clubs that broke the rule as long as
result of any match shall not be allowed. A player may be allowed a benefit
after five years service with a club, in case of accident or when he is giving
up playing. A player shall not be allowed more than one benefit. The consent
of the Council of this Association must be obtained before a player is prom-
ised or receives a benefit.
Id. at 99 (quoting rule 32 of the Football Association).
57. Id.
58. STEVEN TISCHLER, FOOTBALLERS AND BUSINESSMEN: THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCCER IN ENGLAND 63 (1981).
59. Id. (citing CRICKET AND FOOTBALL FIELD, Mar. 20, 1909, at i).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. id.
63. id. at 64 (citing ATHLETIC NEWS, Oct. 24, 1904, at 7).
64. MASON, supra note 42, at 99-100.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 100.
67. TISCHLER, supra note 58, at 64.
[Vol. 3:121
1995] BASEBALL, HOT DOGS, APPLE PIE, AND STRIKES 129
such clubs promised thereafter to honor the £4 wage limit.6" The am-
nesty agreement was signed by the Football League clubs in 1909.69
Not surprisingly, the players were never content with the Maxi-
mum Wage.7" After the amnesty agreement was signed, the players
began to realize that teams would be unwilling to break the Maximum
Wage Rule.' The players, who created the Players' Union in 1907,
threatened to strike during the summer of 1909 if such unfair treatment
were not stopped.72 The night before the opening of the 1909 season,
the owners offered the players an agreement.73 The owners assured
the players that their basic grievances, which included the Maximum
Wage standard, "would be considered in the course of a negotiations
schedule"74 with League and union representation. The owners stated
that they would "continue to press for the removal of the financial
arrangements from the rules." 7 Finally, the owners determined that
not only were the players opposed to the Maximum Wage, but that it
also did not provide owners with the amount of control they wanted
over the sport.76 Those in the Football League stated that they "did
not consider the maximum wage limit restriction was in the interest of
the good government of the game." 77 However, the FA was not yet
ready to agree.
The Maximum Wage remained a law on the Football Association
books for quite some time following the above incident.78 It seemed
that the only change in decades regarding the law was the amount of
the Maximum Wage.79 In 1960, a newly appointed chairman to the
Players' Union strove to eliminate, among other FA policies, the Maxi-
68. Id.
69. Id. The owners began to see that adhering to the rule would save them £243 per week
and again began to support the rule. Id.
70. See id.
71. Seeid. at 111.
72. Id. at 105. In addition to the imposition of the Maximum Wage standard, the substance
of the strike also involved several other matters dealing with the Football Association. Id. at
120.
73. Id. at 119-20.
74. Id. at 120.
75. Id. (citing Football Ass'n Minutes, 1909).
76. Katz, supra note 43, at 401.
77. MASON, supra note 42, at 100 (citing BIRMINGHAM GAZ. AND EXPRESS, June 27,
1908). The owners did not like the fact that they could not punish players for bad play or
reward them for good play. Also, the wealthier clubs felt they should be able to purchase
better players by offering higher wages. Katz, supra note 43, at 401.
78. See Eastham v. NewCastle United Football, Ltd., [1964] 1 Ch. 413, 417-18.
79. Id. at 417. During the 1960 season, the Maximum Wage was £20 per week and £17
per week during the off season.
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mum Wage system.8 0 The chairman, Jimmy Hill, gained massive sup-
port from the players in the union, who then threatened to strike in his
support."' Fearing such industrial action, the FA agreed to abolish the
Maximum Wage system in 1961.82 The first attempted players' strike
in the history of the FA was averted by eliminating the Maximum
Wage system.8 3 Thus, the Maximum Wage fell to its final death in
1961.84
C. Revenue Sharing
In order to understand the revenue sharing controversy that oc-
curred in British football, it is important to understand how the sport is
organized. The Football League is based on a system of promotion and
relegation.85 The Football League, as it appeared at the beginning of its
revenue sharing problems, contained ninety-two teams organized into
four divisions.86 Under this system, the most competitive teams were
placed in division one, and those teams whose competitive level was
lower were placed in divisions two through four. 7 Thus, each divi-
sion consisted of teams that were in the same level of competition.
Through the promotion system, teams whose competitive level increas-
es move up a division. 8 The opposite occurs when a team's com-
petitive level declines; it can be relegated to a lower division.89
The ninety-two teams in the League shared the revenue that was
generated by all.' Although it was the twenty in the top division that
generated the most revenue, a portion of their proceeds filtered down
into the other three divisions.9 The rationale behind this plan was
simple. A club that had more money could use the increased revenue to
buy better players and improve their competitive level, eventually
resulting in a promotion to a higher division.92
80. See WAGG, supra note 43, at 115.
81. Id. at 116-17.
82. Id. at 117.
83. Id.
84. id.
85. Accountancy Magazine Has Looked at the Funding of Football Clubs, ACCOUNTANCY-
U.K., Sept. 7, 1988, at 77.
86. Id. The four divisions were mentioned previously as the original setup of the League.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Telephone interview with Mark Herbert, Chief Sub-Editor, THE TIMES (London),
Sports Section (Sept. 13, 1995).
91. See Top Clubs Pressing Ahead with Television Deal, REUTER, July 1I, 1988, available
in WESTLAW, Int-News file.
92. See generally id.
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D. Revenue Sharing War Beginning
The beginning of the revenue sharing debate centered around
television broadcasting rights. 93 In 1988, the contract for exclusive
rights to the Football League was up for bid."' The British Broadcast-
ing Corporation (BBC) previously held the television rights to broad-
cast all Football League games. 95 Under the BBC agreement with the
League, teams in the first division, which attracted more fans and
generated most of the sports television revenue, shared in this contract
revenue with all teams in the other divisions.96
When the contract with the BBC was set to expire, other television
stations, including Independent Television (ITV) and British Satellite
Broadcasting (BSB), approached the Football League with proposals for
coverage. 97 The proposals set forth by ITV and BSB not only differed
as to amount of money offered,98 but also as to content. ITV initially
offered only to broadcast ten major clubs in the first division and pro-
vide those clubs with a greater share of the revenue instead of filtering
much of the revenue to the lower divisions.99
The debate seemed to signal to many the end of the Football
League as it then stood, with teams in the top division leaving the
League to form their own. " The offer to the ten top clubs to share
the revenue only amongst themselves, instead of with the entire ninety-
two, threatened to make a separation from the League, "in its centena-
ry year, unavoidable. "0' However, the offer changed and stated that
it would encompass all of the Football League teams.1"2 ITV offered
£11 million per year"3 and, when BBC withdrew their offer, secured
the contract with the League."
93. 10M ITV Bid To Show Top Soccer Clubs, DAILY TELEGRAPH-U.K., June 28, 1988, at
2.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. BBC Announces Joint £47M Deal with BSB Guaranteeing Exclusive Coverage of Foot-
ball, INDEPENDENT (London), July 6, 1988, at 32.
100. Compromise Deal in Sight in Televising Football Conflict, INDEPENDENT (London),
July 14, 1988, at 36.
101. Top Clubs Pressing Ahead with Television Deal, supra note 91.
102. The Independent Reports on the Latest Stage of the Battle to Televise Football, INDE-
PENDENT (London), Aug. 4, 1988, at 32.
103. Football League Confirms ITV Deal (BBC Broadcast, Aug. 12, 1988). This amount
was to be linked to the price index and could rise over four years.
104. Id. During the negotiations BBC joined with BSB to make an offer to the League.
However, the two withdrew their joint bid and went on to sign a £30 million deal with the
Football Association.
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Nonetheless, arguments continued regarding how the revenue
would be shared between the divisions. 5 The top clubs in the first
division wanted a greater share than they previously enjoyed under the
BBC contract."° The first division was asking for eighty percent of
the £11 million per year contract, which the League's lower divisions
found unacceptable.' 07
Finally, a compromise was achieved. Under Football League rules,
ten percent of all television money was to go to the Professional
Footballers' Association (PFA). 8 In order to expedite the negotia-
tions between the divisions, the PFA secretary offered to take only five
percent of the television contract for PFA funds." 9 With that offer in
mind, the first division clubs were then persuaded to take only seventy-
five percent of the ITV contract."0 The second division would then
share twelve and one-half percent of the contract, with divisions three
and four sharing the rest."' In spite of the agreement, the Football
League revenue sharing problems were just beginning.
E. Revenue Sharing Failure
As soon as the revenue sharing agreement was made, many felt
that the "deal create[d] a super league in everything but name.""12
The top clubs began to recognize their powerful bargaining tool of
being able to draw the major amount of revenue for the League, and
talk began about the formation of a premier division of the League.13
In June of 1991, clubs in the first division attempted to leave the Foot-
ball League and form their own league, the Premier League, starting
the next season."'
105. PFA Secretary Called in as Mediator in Football League Negotiations, INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 9, 1988, at 30.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The PFA is a players union and, therefore, all funds that the PFA receives goes to
benefit the players in the form of pensions, financial support for clubs, and Football in the
community programs, among other activities. See Peter Ball, Players' Strike Over TV Deal
Looks Inevitable, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1992, at S.
109. PFA Secretary Called in as Mediator in Football League Negotiations, supra note 105.
The PFA Secretary, Gordon Taylor, sacrificed more than £500,000 to which his union was
entitled, by intervening in this situation with this offer. Id.
110. id.
111. Football League Confirms ITV Deal, supra note 103, at 2.
112. The Independent Examines the Implications of the ITV Deal with the Football League,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 4, 1988, at 30 (quoting Geoff Wilcock, of Jordan Information
Service, who compiles annual football finance dossiers).
113. Compromise Deal in Sight in Televising Football Conflict, supra note 100, at 36.
114. David Miller, Leading Clubs Ready to Serve Notice on Football League, THE TIMES
(London), June 12, 1991.
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The FA set into motion the formation of a new league because it
believed, as many suggested, that such a league would bring it more
revenue. 15 The Football League opposed such a split, since the lower
division clubs would be left to fend for themselves, and threatened
court action if the FA went ahead with their plans."16 A court action
ensued, and the Football League contended that under League guide-
lines, a team must give the League three seasons notice to quit." 7
Yet, the FA maintained that its older rule should govern which requires
a team to give only six months notice to exit a league." 8
Deciding that the FA rule should govern, the court allowed those
teams in the first division to go ahead with initiating their action to
form the Premier League.' Before the Football League could ap-
peal, the League clubs voted by an overwhelming majority to remove
the three year rule. 20 It was announced in February of 1992 that
twenty-two clubs in the first division would form the FA Premier
League beginning in August of 1992. 12 Thus, the increased revenue
that a new "superleague" guaranteed to the owners in the top division
clubs, and to the players as well, enticed those teams to break away
from the other divisions in the Football League.'2
F. Problems Continue
Before the Premier League could get off the ground, the threat of
a players' strike loomed.'23 Under the agreement the PFA had with
the Football League, it was entitled to ten percent of television reve-
nues. 24 In 1988, during the dispute over what the first division teams
would take in revenue, the PFA offered to take only five percent to
halt the threat of any breakaway league. 25 With a breakup already in
progress, the PFA attempted to reinstate its guaranteed ten percent
115. See David Lacey, Football Association Seeks High Court Judgement on Right to Form
Premier League, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 13, 1991, at 16.
116. Id.
117. id.
118. Id.
119. David Lacey, Football Clubs Vote to Dismantle Premier League Obstacle, GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 24, 1991, at 14.
120. Id.
121. Peter Ball, Football Premier League Arrives, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 21, 1992.
122. See Lacey, supra note 115, at 16. For allowing the first division to form the Premier
League, divisions two through four settled for £3 million a year for five years following the
breakup. Premier League Given Go-Ahead, REUTER, Sept. 23, 1991, available in WESTLAW,
Int-News file.
123. Peter Ball, PFA Issues Warning of Strike Vote, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 1992.
124. See PFA Secretary Called in as Mediator in Football League Negotiations, supra note
105, at 30.
125. Id.
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entitled revenue under the Football League contract and apply it to the
Premier League.' 26 The PFA reasoned that its basis for taking the
five percent cut, which was to keep the Football League in tact, no
longer existed.' 7
The chairman of the Premier League asserted that they did not
intend to honor any contract made with the Football League. 12' The
PFA then threatened to strike if this issue was not resolved. 9 Nearly
600 first division players voted in what turned out to be a 91.1 percent
backing of the strike. 3' Upon hearing of this, the Premier League
engaged in further negotiations with the PFA in an attempt to avert the
strike. 3' An agreement was finally reached allowing the PFA to re-
ceive ten percent of the first £10 million of television income, and then
five percent of the remaining balance. 32
With the above controversy settled, the new Premier League
played its first game on August 15, 1992.133 However, it left many
teams in the Football League behind to suffer.' It is interesting to
note that the breakup of the FA and creation of the Premier League all
began over the issue of television revenue sharing.
IV. LESSON TO BE LEARNED FROM BRITISH FOOTBALL
A. Maximum Wage Equals Salary Cap
As shown through its history in British football, the Maximum
Wage did not work as it was designed. From its beginning, the Maxi-
mum Wage "was honoured more in the breach than in the obser-
vance. "'15 If MLB were to impose a salary cap system, the same
would be true. Owners who could afford to pay players more would
either find loopholes around the law or break it outright.'36 Thus the
126. Peter Ball, Strike Looms as PFA Calls First Division Ballot, THE TIMES (London),
Mar. 18, 1992, at S.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Soccer Players Back Strike as Union Ponders New Deal, GUARDIAN (London),
Apr. 7, 1992, at 18.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. English Soccer Players' Strike Avoided, REUTER, Apr. 27, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, Int-News file. It was noted that during the first television contract, the PFA
would receive at least £1.5 million per annum.
133. Alan Baldwin, Norwich Manager Blessed with Foresight, REUTER, Aug. 15, 1992,
available in WESTLAW, Int-News file.
134. Clive White, Mixed Reaction Likely to Football Association's Plan for Future of the
Game, THE TIMES (London), June 19, 1991. The Football League revenues have dramatically
decreased as a result of the breakaway.
135. MASON, supra note 42, at 99.
136. Mason notes that when the Maximum Wage was imposed, it was those teams in the
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gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" in baseball would further
increase, frustrating the reason for the rule. The system would do
nothing for the future of baseball except cause more disputes.
B. Revenue Sharing
The revenue sharing plan, as it functioned in British football,
sought to give all divisions within the League an "equal" stance when
it came to monetary concerns. However, as the formation of the Pre-
mier League illustrated, the revenue sharing plan contributed to the
split of the most prosperous clubs in the League.' 37
If American baseball were to implement such a system, it too
would ultimately fall prey to a breakaway league. Although more
equality among talent throughout the teams possibly could occur if
owners were to agree to the proposed revenue sharing plan, owners of
profiting franchises, like the Los Angeles Dodgers, may become dis-
content with the scheme once they see their rewards going to pay the
salaries of top players on other teams. It is conceivable that a Super
League among the MLB could form consisting of those teams who can
accumulate a wealth of profits on their own, as the Premier League did
in Britain.'38 Thus, as witnessed in British football, the only results of
a revenue sharing plan would be a break up of MLB as we know it
today. This outcome would not be in the best interest of the owners,
the players, or the fans of the game of baseball.
V. PROPOSAL FOR A PROSPEROUS FUTURE OF MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL
Considering that baseball had eight work stoppages since 1972,"'
a plan needs to be developed to avert the constant labor-management
problems that seem to plague the industry. The plan offered below
would, in theory, resolve the owners' complaint regarding soaring
costs in the industry, as well as answer the players' concerns regarding
the salary cap.
First Division who were especially breaking the rules. id. Not ironic at all, it was those teams
in the First Division who took in the most money.
137. See John Duncan, No Plaques to Mark the Day that Football Nearly Died, GUARDIAN
(London), May 29, 1995, at 3.
138. This thought is not totally absurd, given that at the beginning of professional baseball,
other leagues attempted to form. See Katz, supra note 43, at 373-76, for an excellent discus-
sion of this matter.
139. Ronald Blum, Union, Owners Meet, Deadline Looms as Talks Resume, RECORD (N.
N.J.), Sept. 8, 1994, at S1.
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A. Players' Tax Proposal
During strike negotiations, some talk arose regarding a surtax on
those teams who spent a certain percentage of revenue above the league
average on salaries. 40 The plan suggested that the money generated
from the tax would be redistributed to other teams whose revenue was
low."' While the tax provides a basis for a solution to the current
financial problems affecting baseball, its immediate redistribution to
lower revenue producing clubs is not prudent.
B. Real Solution
The taxing concept that was introduced late in the negotiation
process does have merit. A tax should be in place for those teams
generating the greatest revenue. However, the tax should be set in the
following manner. Initially, a base average needs to be calculated in
order to determine what the average club generates in revenue. At that
point, a decision needs to be made as to how much above that average
a team would have to generate in revenue in order to be taxed. Once
that amount is decided, the percentage of the tax needs to be defined.
Keeping in mind how the Maximum Wage failed in British football
because owners repeatedly broke the rule, 42 the question then posed
is who would ensure adherence to these rules?
C. Board Of Directors
As a possible solution, a Board of Directors of Major League
Baseball could be installed in the MLB organization to guarantee com-
pliance with the tax laws.'43 More importantly, the Board would be in
charge of voting to determine what amount of excess revenue generated
would be taxed and what that tax rate would be.
The proposed Board would consist of nine people'" having no
140. Id. The basic version of the plan stated that teams would be forced to spend at least
eighty-four percent of the league average in minor league systems and player salaries. Teams
that spent more than 110 percent of their average would then be taxed on the amount by which
they exceeded the average. Dickey, supra note 16, at BI.
141. Sullivan, supra note 19, at CI. It was also noted that the tax plan emerged late in the
negotiation process, and the owners never really responded because of their hope of an impasse
declaration. Dickey, supra note 16, at B I. The owners have also begun talks regarding a pay-
roll tax. Ross Newhan, Baseball Players Offer To End 232-Day Strike, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 1,
1995, at 1.
142. See MASON, supra note 42, at 99.
143. Some might see a similarity between the proposed Board and how the Football Associ-
ation (FA) operates in conjunction with the Football League. Although a similarity may exist,
the role of the Board would be quite different than the role of the FA because the Board would
be dealing strictly with financial matters, as the FA deals with rules regarding the playing of
the game in the British football system.
144. Since this is also the number of justices on the Supreme Court and it seems to have
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financial connection with the baseball world. These individuals would
run for Board positions in the same manner as a trustee election is held
for colleges and universities. The Board would be comprised of mem-
bers whose reputations, preferably in the business world, have gained
them respect and prestige. Those seeking membership would campaign
for the post as in any other election.
Any promises or monetary commitments made to any owner or
player would be grounds for immediate disqualification from the elec-
tion and from the Board. Board members would not be permitted to
accept any items, monetary or otherwise, from either players or own-
ers. Strict adherence to these guidelines would be required.
The Board would be elected in the following manner. Each owner
of an MLB team and one player representative from each team would
be allowed to cast a vote for Board members. The player representative
would be elected by a majority vote of the players on the team. If, by
some chance, a player is traded or retires after being voted to be a
representative of the team, he would lose his position as a voter and a
new player would immediately be elected.
To ensure impartiality, the Board would sit for a three year term,
and members could be re-elected to the position only once. Elections
would take place once every three years. The nine people who receive
a majority of the votes would be sworn in as Board members. If any
Board member leaves the Board before their term expires, an emergen-
cy election would take place. Board members would receive only nom-
inal fees because the prestige of such a position would not require
much payment.
D. Board's Function
After the taxes are levied against the teams as described above, the
money would be placed in a high interest generating account. Such
money would be collected at the end of each season, but must be paid
by November 15 of each year. The Board's main functions would be
carried on during the off-season, but the Board would remain on call
and have at least one meeting per month during the baseball season.
From November 15 until November 30 of each year, each Major
League team would be allowed to submit a proposal to the Board ask-
ing for a specific amount of money to be drawn out of the tax generat-
ed revenue pool. Using proceeds from the revenue tax directly for
player's salaries would be strictly prohibited. If it is discovered that the
team is using the money for salaries, they would incur a tremendous
fine. Teams could petition for money to be used for stadium mainte-
nance, promotional events, uniforms, bats and balls, and other inciden-
worked for them, it would seem prudent to use the same composition for the proposed Board.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
tals.
Once a proposal is submitted, the Board would review it and make
a decision. The Board would be required to notify all petitioning teams
of the status of their proposal by January 30 of each year. The Board
would have the power to deny or approve any proposal and allocate
funds accordingly. If such a proposal is approved, the Board would
distribute the proceeds to the team by February 15 of that year. The
Board has the discretion to deplete the entire revenue account every
year or to only use a portion of it and allow the remainder to accumu-
late into the following year's proposed budget. Also, the Board has the
discretion to only give a team a portion of the money that they request.
Furthermore, a team would be required to show proof of the expenses
they incurred for the project for which the money in the proposal was
sought. '45
All teams may submit a proposal each year, even those teams who
are actually being taxed. All teams' proposals would be given the same
standard of consideration.
E. Players' And Owners' Concerns Both Remedied By Board
Although the proposal set out above for a Board is not foolproof,
it does provide a beginning for solving both the players' and owners'
current concerns. First, no salary cap can be read into this proposal.
While it is true that higher revenue generating clubs would be taxed, it
would still be in their discretion as to what percentage they would want
to spend on players salaries.
As for the owners concerns, those teams with low revenue would
be able to petition for extra money. The extra money would then be
granted to the team if it was shown that the money was needed for
good cause, as previously outlined. For example, even though the San
Diego Padres may not make as much money as the New York Yan-
kees, they could petition the Board for money for promotional events
to draw more people to the stadium. They could then use the money
they have already earned for players' salaries or whatever else they
may need.
Finally, the above plan would also alleviate concerns that owners
have about players' salaries skyrocketing. Those teams generating high
amounts of revenue would have to pay some of that revenue in taxes.
Thus, even those teams who do produce high revenue would have
somewhat of a limit on the amount of money they could spend on
salaries, and the players would be aware of this.
145. This could be done through receipts and contracts, etc.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Major League Baseball could have saved the 1994 World Series if
it had taken a history lesson in sports law from British football. If it
had done so, it would have realized that the salary cap and revenue
sharing proposals the baseball players and owners were advancing had
caused nothing but more turmoil when implemented in British football.
The proposed MLB Board of Directors would serve to better cope with
the problems facing the baseball industry in a more efficient manner.
On a final note, fortunately the MLB owners and players were not
as adamant about solving their labor dispute as was the Ukraine Soccer
League. Players on the Ukraine team were demanding that their apart-
ments, provided by the clubs, be privatized in their names." 6 Upon
learning of the demand, the president of the league punched out the
strike leader, leaving the leader unemployed and ceasing any talk of a
strike. '47 Luckily for all baseball fans, Major League Baseball has not
resorted to these types of measures-yet.
Natalie M. Gurdak
146. UK: Soccer-Notebook, REUTER, Feb. 21, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Int-News
file.
147. The president was Podillya Khmelnytsky and the player involved was Volodymyr
Batalov. Id.

